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 1. Introduction 
Corruption, defined as the abuse of public power for positive gain, is a prominent 
issue all over the world, intensified by the globalization of commerce. Even though 
corruption is believed prevalent in developing countries (Hellman et al. 2000), it is 
encountered at different degrees in all countries. Consequently, many international 
organizations and countries adopt coordinated measures to curb it.  Nonetheless, reports 
from Transparency International show that corruption is still widespread.  
Most of the scholars studying the effects of corruption on Foreign Direct 
Investment (FDI) support the “grabbing hand” view of the phenomenon, arguing that 
corruption creates significant costs for foreign entrants and, as a result, negatively affects 
investment flows into a host country (Javorcik & Wei, 2009; Mauro, 1995; Voyer & 
Beamish, 2004; Wei, 2000). This is a result of the uncertainty that surrounds corruption, 
which unpredictably increases the cost of setting up and operating in the host country and 
consequently the attractiveness of foreign investment (Demirbag et al., 2007; Uhlenbruck 
et al. 2006; Wei, 1997). Another stream of research advances the opposing view: that 
corruption acts as a “helping hand” to commerce, a bribing mechanism which facilitates 
transactions, speeds up procedures and ultimately helps FDI (Egger & Winner, 2005; Lui, 
1985; Wheeler & Mody, 1992). Empirical findings are inconclusive, with studies 
reporting results in both directions (Barassi & Zhou, 2012; Egger & Winner, 2005; Habib 
& Zurawicki, 2002, Helmy, 2013; Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012; Al-Sadig, 2009; Wheeler 
& Mody, 1992). An explanation which accommodates both theoretical arguments may be 
that the relationship between corruption and FDI is not linear and that, both theoretical 
views hold at different levels of corruption.  
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Moreover, the current literature mostly focuses on the impact of corruption on 
FDI patterns across countries (Brouthers et al., 2008; Egger & Winner, 2005; Habib & 
Zurawicki, 2002).  Given that a key decisive attribute is the perceived uncertainty in the 
host country created by corruption, it may be appropriate to examine this relationship at 
firm level in order to consider firms’ strategic motives and managers’ perception of the 
local environment (Brouthers et al., 2008). Hitherto, scholars have paid little attention to 
MNE resource commitment strategies which deal with host country corruption 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006). A firm level approach may also shed 
light on the findings of some country-level studies which suggest that highly attractive 
markets tend to mitigate the negative effect of corruption on FDI (Voyer & Beamish, 
2004; Wei, 2000). 
The setting of this study is the banking industry. In the last two decades, banks 
faced with saturated local markets have looked overseas for growth (Petrou, 2009). 
However, Multinational Banks (MNB’s) are susceptible to host country corruption 
because their operations are supervised by local authorities (Buch, 2003); a state of 
affairs which gives corrupt officials the chance to engage in bribery. Moreover, 
government officials try to control banks in order to influence lending decisions. In light 
of this, scholars put forward the following two competing theoretical arguments: 1) the 
“political” view, suggesting that corrupt government officials influence the funding of 
projects in favor of politically connected firms, thus contributing to the increase of bad 
loans; and 2) the “development” view, proposing that government officials aim to direct 
projects in line with their strategy for economic development, which helps banks where 
corruption is prevalent and information asymmetries are high to identify the best projects 
 5 
(La Porta et al., 2002). Despite the theoretical and managerial challenges identified 
above, current research is silent about the influence of corruption on bank commitment to 
foreign markets.  
The objectives of the present study are two-fold: first, to investigate the effect of 
both views of corruption, the “grabbing hand” and the “helping hand,” on the relationship 
between corruption and FDI at firm level; and, second, to explore how market-seeking 
motives moderate this relationship. We consider Pagano (2008), who investigates a non-
linear relationship between corruption and lending rates in relation to the “political” and 
the “development” views, and we test a non-linear relationship between corruption and 
MNB market commitment. We adopt a resource perspective and draw on the resource 
dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and institutional theory (DiMaggio & 
Powell, 1983; Scott, 1995) to support our hypothesis that the effect of corruption on 
MNB commitment is U-shaped. In addition, we examine the moderating effect of market-
seeking motivation, arguing that this dominates decisions about market commitment.  
We test our hypotheses on a sample of 131 bank entries in forty host countries. 
Data on bank motives are collected through a mail survey sent to 385 multinational banks 
identified in the 2004 issue of the Banker’s Almanac. Corruption is measured using the 
Transparency International CPI Index and market commitment is measured by the capital 
invested in the host country. The findings support a U-shaped relationship. A significant 
and negative linear coefficient suggests that, at low to moderate levels of corruption, the 
“grabbing hand” view prevails, and a significant and positive quadratic coefficient 
indicates that, at high levels of corruption, the “helping hand” view dominates. In 
addition, there is a significant and positive interaction between market-seeking and 
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corruption for both the linear and the quadratic terms, indicating that the relationship is 
positively moderated by market-seeking motives at both the descending and the 
ascending parts of the curve. Similar results are found when the share of equity is used as 
an alternative measure of market commitment, attesting to the robustness of our findings. 
This study makes a number of contributions. First, the findings indicate that both 
opposing theoretical arguments hold, but at different levels of corruption, a finding which 
may contribute to the resolution of a long-standing debate on the effect of corruption on 
FDI. Second, responding to calls to investigate firm strategies for dealing with corruption 
(Rodriguez et al., 2005), the study draws on the resource dependence theory and the 
institutional theory to examine how banks manage the costs of corruption through their 
capital investment decisions. This approach complements the transaction cost or 
institutional theory arguments of those scholars who examine the choice of mode of entry 
in conditions of corruption. Third, this study adds to our understanding of the types of 
risk and cost involved in bank foreign entries and the way in which these interplay with 
growth motives to influence market commitment. This is the first study to investigate 
how corruption affects bank strategies regarding foreign markets contributing this way to 
the literature on bank internationalization.  
 
2. Literature review and hypotheses 
Corruption is seen as a tax on foreign firms (Mauro, 1995; Wei, 2000; Voyer & 
Beamish, 2004). Nevertheless, the greatest challenge for most MNEs is not the 
magnitude of the cost in itself but rather the difficulty to assess the actual cost the MNE 
will have to pay as a result of the uncertainty associated with corrupt conditions (Wei, 
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1997). Besides bribes to government officials, foreign firms may encounter transaction 
costs due to poor contract enforcement  (Doh et al., 2003; Fisman, 2001), may face 
information asymmetries when vital information is withheld, and may encounter 
difficulties in gaining legitimacy due to reduced transparency (Javorcik & Wei, 2009). 
On this basis, two theoretical views have arisen on the influence of corruption on FDI: 
the “grabbing hand’’ view, suggesting that corruption creates uncertainty about the use of 
resources in the host country, an obstacle to FDI; and the “helping hand” view, which 
supports that corruption, at a cost, assists transactions and speeds-up procedures, thus 
helping FDI (Egger & Winner, 2005).  
Most scholars who examine the effect of corruption on aggregate patterns of FDI 
suggest that corrupt countries receive less foreign investment because the covert bribing 
system acts as a “grabbing hand”, creating additional costs and risks for investors 
(Brouthers et al., 2008; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). A number of empirical studies 
support these arguments (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002, Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012; Voyer & 
Beamish, 2004; Wei, 2000). For example, Javorcik and Wei (2009) show that reducing 
corruption by 4.7 points (on a scale of 1 to 10) would increase FDI by 15%. Another 
stream of research suggests that high levels of corruption foster FDI, since corruption 
“greases the wheels” by facilitating transactions and investments which otherwise would 
not take place (Aidt, 2003; Leff, 1964; Lui, 1985; Wheeler & Mody, 1992). In contrast to 
the above empirical research, some studies support this positive perspective (Egger & 
Winner, 2005; Helmy, 2013; Barassi & Zhou, 2012). Egger and Winner (2005), for 
example, taking a sample of 73 countries over the period 1995-1999, find clear evidence 
of a positive relationship between corruption and FDI. These inconclusive empirical 
 8 
findings about the effect of corruption on FDI are further supported by other studies, 
which they find insignificant results (Alesina & Weber, 2002; Al-Sadig, 2009; Wheeler 
& Mody, 1992).  
As regards banking, scholars advance two contrasting theoretical arguments, the 
“political” view and the “development” view (La Porta et al., 2002). Proponents of the 
political view (Kornai, 1979; Becker, 1983; Shleifer & Vishny, 1994; 1998) argue that in 
corrupt countries government officials intervene to influence lending decisions in favor 
of politically connected firms, thus distorting lending rates (La Porta et al., 2002), and 
shifting funds towards bad projects (Stigler, 1975; Park, 2012). As a result, corruption 
contributes both to the increase of bad loans and to lowering the quality of private 
investments (Beck et al., 2006; Pagano, 2008). Some empirical studies testify to the 
“political” view (Beck et al., 2006; Pagano, 2002; Park, 2012). For example, Park (2012) 
in a cross-sectional study of data from over 76 countries finds that corruption contributes 
to the increase of bad loans and the re-direction of funds from normal to bad projects. 
The “development” view (Gerschenkron, 1962) suggests that, in corrupt countries, 
governments try to control the banking system so that they can influence the funding of 
socially desirable projects, thereby promoting financial development and growth.  Pagano 
(2008) explores these two competing views by assessing the effects of corruption and 
government intervention on commercial lending rates, using a non-linear model. He  
finds that low to moderate levels of corruption relate to lower lending rates, providing 
evidence for the “development” view, whereas high levels of corruption are associated 
with higher credit rates, pointing towards the “political” view.  
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Given that the corruption-related uncertainty perceived in the host country may be 
an important factor for foreign investment, a firm level setting is required to capture the 
underpinning motivations, such as firms’ strategies and managers’ perception of the local 
environment (Brouthers et al., 2008). Most firm level studies focus on the effect of 
corruption on firms’ decisions over the mode of entry, in particular the choice between 
wholly owned investments and joint ventures (Duanmu, 2011; Javorcik & Wei, 2009; 
Smarzynska & Wei, 2002; Tekin-Kory, 2006; Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). Nevertheless, firm 
level research says nothing about the way in which MNEs manage the effect of 
corruption on their operation in the host country through decisions on resource 
investment (Rodriguez et al. 2005).  
 
2.1. Corruption and MNB host country commitment 
Corruption entails problems for MNEs when managers cannot estimate bribery 
demands and when they are uncertain if the promised service will be delivered, posing a 
threat to the success of the foreign operation (Rodriguez et al., 2005). This is a result of 
the varying demands from an uncontrollable number of government officials, who, in 
their quest for bribes, randomly distort government policies and regulations (Doh et al., 
2003; Javorcik & Wei, 2009) and reduce firm benefits from bribery thus, undermining 
the effectiveness of the bribing system (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Government officials 
may not be effective in collecting bribes if they are perceived to be unreliable, which in 
turn may reduce the level of corruption in a country (Wei, 1997). Thus, in highly corrupt 
countries where the potential pay-offs to government employees are high, corrupt 
officials may set normative controls which reduce the uncertainty of corruption for the 
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firm and maximize rents for themselves. Consequently, we argue that in a high corruption 
environment the ‘rules of the game’ are likely to be known, which reduces uncertainty for 
the MNE; whereas, at moderate levels of corruption, bribery may not be organized and 
the engagement of officials in corruption may be opportunistic and random, thereby 
increasing uncertainty.  
To exercise their intermediation role effectively, banks which enter a host country 
may require locally-bound resources, such as know-how and the relational assets 
essential for providing access to consumers, businesses or institutions (Miller & Parkhe, 
2002), together with information about regulations and markets (Buch, 2003). However, 
access to these resources may be conditional on the MNB’s ability to gain external 
legitimacy with supervisory authorities and peer-institutions (Lensink et al. 2008). Firms 
experience institutional pressure to conform to society’s expectations in the host country 
relating to regulative, normative and competitive practices (Kostova & Zaheer, 1999). 
Such conformity can legitimize a firm, ensuring that the relevant actors in the 
institutional environment will accept it. Consequently, the MNB’s ability to access local 
resources may depend on the degree of its legitimacy with the supervisory authorities and 
peer institutions (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). To achieve legitimacy, firms pursue 
institutional isomorphism by complying with local regulations, following established 
social norms and imitating successful competitors (DiMaggio & Powel, 1983).  However, 
gaining legitimacy is more difficult in countries with moderate levels of corruption, 
where bribery is not organized (Shleifer & Vishny, 1993). Corrupt officials may 
indiscriminately circumvent the information exchange process by reducing the 
availability of information to the MNB about the requirements of the legitimating actors 
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and/or by creating a false profile of the subsidiary (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006). MNBs are 
predictably less able to manage the external environment and gain legitimacy when faced 
with arbitrary distortions of policies and regulations (Vaaler & Schrage, 2009). This 
complex institutional environment compromises the MNE’s ability to determine the 
process of legitimization, thus making compliance difficult. This may negatively affect 
the MNB’s dealings with local institutions, possibly resulting in additional local 
supervision and in compromised transactions with peer institutions, including access to 
funds and to locally bound resources (Claessens & Van Horen, 2012). Moreover, as a 
condition for gaining acceptance, the MNB may have to surrender to political pressures 
and fund the less attractive projects of politically well-connected companies (Park, 2012). 
In an environment where corruption is arbitrary, the MNB may be unaware how peer 
institutions respond to these pressures and what the projections are for bad loans, thereby 
adding to its perceived uncertainty in the host country.       
In addition, given that corruption compromises the functioning of key governance 
institutions, it may encourage the practices of interfacing agents such as auditors and 
lawyers (Chan & Makino, 2007), thus increasing the information asymmetries about 
transactions (Berger & DeYoung, 1997). Arbitrary corruption may weaken regulation and 
consequently contractual agreements (Uhlenbruck et al. 2006), since laws and regulations 
may be interpreted differently from government officials (Rodriguez et al., 2005). 
Consequently, the MNB may face first the risk of not properly assessing deals and, next, 
the consequent risk of not being able to exercise its contracts, exposing it to significant 
financial loss (Mian, 2006). In light of ill decisions, the foreign bank may find it difficult 
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to defend its soundness to the supervisory authorities and market participants, risking its 
exclusion from the host market (Tsai et al. 2011).  
Increasing uncertainty in moderate levels of corruption, about the bank’s ability to 
gain legitimacy, access information and locally-bound resources and protect its capital, 
raises some doubts about investment returns (Miller & Parkhe, 2002). Consequently, 
banks become risk-averse and limit their business activity and resource investment in the 
host country (Claessens & Van Horen, 2012) as the literature on the internationalization 
behavior of the firm implies (Johanson & Valhne, 1977).  In contrast, in highly corrupt 
countries, where the ‘rules of the game’ are known, corruption creates the means for 
foreign entrants to access more efficiently the political processes and resources of the 
host country (Uhlenbruck, et al., 2006). The MNB may perceive an opportunity to ‘buy’ 
legitimacy by acquiring government consent with their actions, consequently 
safeguarding contracts and obtaining the required infrastructure (Rodriguez et al., 2005). 
All these assets may be deemed valuable in the pursuit of growth in the host country, 
resulting in lower perceived uncertainty and higher market commitment. Therefore, the 
following hypothesis may be posited: 
 
H1: The effect of host country corruption on MNB capital commitment is U-shaped such 
that as corruption increases from low to moderate levels, capital commitment in the host 
country decreases and as corruption increases from moderate to high levels, capital 
commitment increases. 
 
2.2. Market-seeking strategies and host country commitment  
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A firm’s foreign market-seeking strategies aim to exploit host country 
opportunities by capitalising on the firm’s capabilities (Cui & Jiang, 2009; Makino et al., 
2002). The resource dependence theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) suggests that foreign 
entrants may require local resources to overcome the liability of operating in a foreign 
market where local rivals possess market-oriented resources and information (Moran, 
1985; Xu et al., 2006; Zaheer, 1995). Scholars have identified market-seeking strategies 
as an important motive for bank internationalization (Berger et al. 2000; Weller & Scher, 
2001). MNBs faced with saturated markets at home and armed with product and 
technological know-how and surplus resources want to escape the growth constraints of 
their home countries and pursue opportunities in attractive foreign countries (Focarelli & 
Pozzolo, 2005) where they can leverage their ownership advantages (Tschoegl, 2002).  
For example, Khoury & Pal (2000) suggest that the presence of foreign banks in the US 
can be explained by the opportunities which exist in different market segments of the 
economy. 
Market-seeking MNBs create rents in a foreign country by lending to local 
consumers, companies or institutions (Cerruti et al. 2007; Weller & Scher, 2001). To 
grow their loan portfolios, MNBs attract local deposits or use their own funds (Miller & 
Parkhe, 2002).  As a result, a foreign bank pursues its growth motives by allocating 
capital to the host country to underwrite loans and access local complementary resources 
(Lensink et al., 2008; Petrou, 2007), including assets to support its operations, such as a 
distribution network and possibly a pool of deposits in local currency (DeYoung & Nolle, 
1996).  
 14 
Nevertheless, domestic banks enjoy certain advantages. They possess better 
information about the business environment (Claessens & Van Horen, 2012), they enjoy 
market-specific resources such as relationships with regulators and clients (DeYoung & 
Nolle, 1996) and they benefit from the local physical infrastructure such as distribution 
networks (Berger et al., 2000). It is not surprising therefore that Miller & Parkhe (2002), 
who studied bank foreign operations around the globe, find empirical evidence of liability 
of foreignness. Consequently, MNBs pursuing market-seeking strategies may require 
significant resources in the host country to overcome such a liability and develop a 
sizeable loan portfolio which far exceeds the resource requirements of market 
participation or following-the-client strategies of targeting niche and less competitive 
market segments (Luo, 2003). Previous studies confirm the positive relationship of local 
market strategies and market commitment (Gil et al. 2006; Luo, 2004; Makino et al. 
2002). As a result, it is expected that: 
 
H2: The greater the market-seeking motives of an MNB, the greater that MNB’s 
commitment of capital in the host country. 
 
2.3. The moderating effect of market-seeking strategies 
A market-seeking bank which aims to develop and expand its loan portfolio in a 
host country may focus on managing loan defaults (Beck et al., 2006) by addressing the 
issue of unreliable information about the financial strength of borrowers and the legal 
status and value of collateral placed against loans (Tsai et al., 2011). To this end, the 
MNB may invest in providing itself with links to other financial institutions and support 
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organizations, such as credit agencies and property assessors. Moreover, the bank may 
allocate additional resources to lending by recruiting credit analysts and relationship 
managers locally, so that it is in a position to assess and monitor borrowers better (Berger 
& DeYoung, 1997).  This additional resource investment tends to be higher in countries 
with moderate levels of corruption, where there is uncertainty about the reliability of 
information and consequently higher projections for non-performing loans.  
In addition, market-seeking banks may invest more resources than non-market-
seeking banks do to build legitimacy with local institutions by adopting the same sort of 
organization and operation practices as peer banks do, by building a local image, and by 
adhering to supervisory requirements. The conferring of legitimacy on the MNB is seen 
as a process of negotiation between managers and institutions (Kostova et al., 2008). 
However, the efficiency of the bank’s management in communicating with the 
legitimating agents will be compromised and thus inefficient in an environment with 
moderate levels of corruption characterized by reduced regulatory transparency and 
random bureaucracy (Chan & Makino, 2007). To manage in these conditions, the bank 
may recruit more local staff with knowledge of local bank practices and staff who have 
access to regulators and incumbent bank management (Miller & Parkhe, 2002). Their 
task is to develop the bank’s operating practices and liaise between the bank and the 
relevant agents so as to restore and maintain positive working relationships. In addition, 
the bank may invest additional marketing resources to indicate its commitment and 
legitimate standing in order to develop and sustain a positive local image (Eden & Miller, 
2004).  
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Not investing the additional resources required may hinder the development of a 
sizeable, profitable loan portfolio and thus, limit the growth of the MNB. The potential 
losses from bad loans will constrain the bank’s investment and hamper its legitimacy in 
the eyes of the local supervisory bodies and peer institutions (Berger & DeYoung, 1997).  
Furthermore, slowness in building legitimacy with local institutions may affect the 
development of a bank’s distribution and operations infrastructure, since local banks may 
be unwilling to sell or share critical assets (Eden & Miller, 2004). Consequently, market-
seeking MNBs will invest additional resources to ensure that the risks associated with 
moderate levels of corruption are properly mitigated; hence, “defensive” investment may 
rise as corruption increases from low to moderate levels.  
Moreover, a market-seeking MNB may perceive higher rewards in countries with 
high levels of corruption where the “rules of the game” are known. Managers may take 
advantage of the reduced uncertainty and engage in more “offensive” investment in the 
host country than those in low market-seeking banks, by creating the capacity in their 
bank to acquire and service a larger loan portfolio (Voyer & Beamish, 2004). As a result, 
it is expected that:  
 
H3: The corruption – capital commitment relationship is positively moderated by market-
seeking motives at both the descending and the ascending portions of the U-curve. 
 
3. Methods 
3.1. Sample and Data Quality 
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Hypotheses in the present study are tested on a dataset compiled from primary 
and secondary sources. Data on bank motives were collected through a mail survey, 
MNB financial data were accessed from the Banker’s Almanac and information on 
institutions was gathered from the survey and country reports. A list of 385 multinational 
banks was compiled from the 2004 issue of the Bankers’ Almanac and the survey was 
sent to management committee executives with international business responsibilities, as 
identified in the Banker’s Almanac and the banks’ web-sites. One or more surveys were 
sent to each bank, depending on the number of its foreign operations (one for every five 
foreign operations, up to a maximum of five surveys). Executives were asked to provide 
information about a recent foreign entry made by their bank in which they were 
personally involved.  Phone calls were made 10 days after this request to confirm receipt 
and a second and third round of reminders followed, at three-week intervals. Of the 562 
questionnaires sent, a total of 147 were returned (a response rate of 26%) of which 131 
responses were usable for the study. The respondents were mostly members of the 
executive committee, managing directors of foreign operations or directors of 
international operations. Comparing the characteristics of the focal bank sample – 
country of origin, size and number of countries present – with the multinational bank 
population compiled from the Banker’s Almanac indicated no significant differences, 
which attests to the representativeness of the sample. To further probe any self-selection 
bias, the Heckman’s two-stage procedure was adopted by first running a probit model on 
the probability of foreign entry within five years, the period defined by the sample, using 
size, country of origin and Return on Equity (ROE) as the identifying variables. The 
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model and the variables were not significant. The Inverse Mills ratio calculated from this 
procedure was entered in subsequent analysis, but it was also insignificant.    
The banks surveyed entered 40 different host countries with varying scores for 
corruption, based on Transparency’s International CPI Index (Table 1). 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Table 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Moreover, post-hoc data quality checks were performed. The data were tested for 
consistency by comparing the information on nine ventures, provided by two different 
respondents familiar with the particular entry decision, across all 7-point scale responses. 
89% of the responses were within an interval or less, which is in line with the researcher 
guidelines (Shortell & Zajac, 1990). Non-response bias was assessed by asking thirty 
randomly selected non-respondents to complete a shorter version of the questionnaire. 
The responses and the organizational demographics of the sixteen participants were 
compared with the rest of the sample, indicating no statistically significant differences on 
any of these dimensions (p-values were above 0.21).  Furthermore, those who responded 
to the first mailing were contrasted to those who responded to the second mailing across 
the same organizational demographics. Again, no statistically significant differences were 
found (p-values were above 0.26), thereby indicating that no non-response bias was 
present in the sample (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). 
In addition, several measures were adopted in accordance with the suggestions by 
Podsakoff et al. (2003) to eliminate common method variance. To avoid situations where 
respondents could make a connection between exploratory and dependent variables, the 
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questions pertaining to market commitment and bank motivation were placed in different 
sections and pages of the questionnaire. Moreover, the dependent variable was calculated 
by combining primary and secondary data and corruption, the main exploratory variable, 
was derived from the secondary sources. Finally, confirmatory factor analysis verified 
construct validity for all three perceptual measures used. All the above preventive actions 
and the results of post-hoc investigation may indicate that common method bias posed no 
problems in this study (Chang et al. 2010). 
  
4. Measures 
4.1. Dependent variables 
Market commitment is measured by the MNB’s capital investment in the host 
country scaled by the bank’s total capital (Pedersen & Petersen, 1998). The data on the 
capital committed in the host country at the time of the investment were provided by the 
respondents and, for most of the acquisitions (29 cases), were verified with data from 
public announcements. In 20 additional cases it was possible to cross-reference this 
information with a second executive. The bank’s total capital at the time of the 
investment was taken from the Banker’s Almanac. An alternative measure of the 
dependent variable, the percentage of the Share of Equity owned by the bank in the 
foreign venture at the time of entry (Chari & Chang, 2009), was measured from the data 
provided by the respondents (49 entries were cross-checked with a second source).  
 
4.2. Exploratory variables 
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Three types of corruption measures are available, but all of these are subjective, 
since the elusive nature of corruption renders quantification difficult (Wei, 2000). The 
first type is based on ratings given by in-house experts, such as the ICRG ratings; the 
second type is based on surveys of business executives in the country under evaluation, 
for example, the Global Competitiveness Report; and the third type is an average of 
existing measures, such as the CPI Index. The latter is the most common measure used in 
corruption studies (Habib & Zurawicki, 2002; Judge et al., 2011; Weitzel & Berns, 2006).  
It is worth noting, however, that all corruption measures are highly correlated (Tanzi, 
1998).  In this study, Corruption is measured using the CPI Index, which incorporates 
expert surveys conducted by 12 different organizations. The score which takes values 
from 0 to 10 (0 indicating the highest degree of corruption) is reversed so as to be more 
intuitive. As a robustness test, the analysis was run using the Heritage Foundation’s 
Corruption Freedom score derived from data originating from sources such as the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, the Country Commercial Guide, and the Economist 
Intelligence Unit. Corruption was measured at the year before the establishment of the 
foreign venture.  
Market seeking motivation (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.807) was measured by a four-
item construct capturing the importance of the following motives at the time of the 
investment (on a Likert scale from 1-7): achieving growth through a local opportunity, 
lending to local customers, accessing deposits in local currency, and exploiting the bank’s 
competitive advantage in the local market. Confirmatory factor analysis supported the 
validity of the construct (CMIN/DF= 0.474). 
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4.3. Control variables  
A number of institutional and firm-specific variables found in previous studies to 
influence foreign market commitment were included in the analysis. Formal institutional 
factors may increase information asymmetries and transaction costs and consequently, 
create legitimacy constraints for the MNB and increase the costs of defaulting loans 
(Claessens & Van Hoven, 2012). Aggregate formal institutional measures were found to 
be highly correlated with corruption measures from secondary sources and, as a result, it 
was thought appropriate to develop perceptual measures for two commonly used factors, 
formal institutional differences between the home and the host country and country 
stability (Dikova et al., 2009; Duanmu, 2011; Uhlenbruck et al., 2006).  Institutional 
Differences (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.903) was measured by asking respondents to evaluate, 
on a Likert scale from 1-7, the differences between the home and host country across four 
formal institutional systems: legal, economic, political and business (Salomon & Wu, 
2012).  Confirmatory factor analysis confirmed the robustness of the construct 
(CMIN/DF= 0.635). Country Stability (Cronbach’s alpha = 0.824) was measured by 
asking respondents to evaluate the political, economic and social stability at the time of 
the investment (Oetzel et al., 2001; Root, 1987). Confirmatory factor analysis validated 
the construct (CMIN/DF= 0.441).  
The informal institutional environment was measured by two of Hofstede’s 
cultural dimensions, Power Distance (PDI) and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI), using the 
Kogut and Singh (1988) distance measure (Parboteeah et al., 2008; Weitzel & Berns, 
2006). This approach was taken in response to criticism of the composite index for its 
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lack of theoretical relevance in foreign entry studies and its conflicting results 
(McSweeney, 2002; Kirkman et al., 2006).  
  Given the highly regulated nature of banking, the study controlled for both home 
and host country restrictions on foreign entry (Cerutti et al., 2007; Venzin et al., 2008).   
Host Country Restrictions and Home Country Restrictions were both dummy variables 
established by asking respondents to indicate whether the constraints in the host (home) 
country were imposed by state regulation or whether the local banking system regulator 
restrained the MNB from achieving its desired level of investment or share of equity in 
the host country. Responses were cross-checked with public information on country 
restrictions on foreign bank entry and on home bank investments in foreign countries.   
Three firm level variables were included in the analysis. Experience measured by 
the number of years of presence in the host country, Size measured by the firm’s total 
number of employees, and finally, Acquisition, a dummy variable capturing the type of 
entry in the host country.  
  
5. Results 
Table 2 shows the descriptive statistics and correlations. Most variables, 
consistent with prior literature, correlated with the dependent variable and exhibited the 
expected sign. The highest correlation was 0.395 which may indicate that 
multicollinearity did not pose a problem for the analysis. This was further supported by 
the variance inflation factor values from the regression analysis, which were lower than 
the threshold of 10, and, the tolerance values which were higher than the threshold of 
0.10 (Hair et al., 1998). 
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------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
 To investigate the hypothesis about the U-shaped relationship between corruption 
and Capital Invested, a number of diagnostic tests were performed namely, the Chow test 
to identify structural break points in the data and a scatter plot fitted with a quadratic 
equation. The Chow test, which is a variation of the F-test for a restriction, establishes 
whether two regression lines fit the data better than one regression line at a particular 
point by calculating an F-statistic using the residual sum of squares of the regression 
lines. A significant F-statistic indicated that there was a structural break at this point. 
Table 3 shows that there are break points in our data around the corruption level of 5. 
Moreover, the scatter plot shown in Figure 1 indicates that a quadratic U-shaped curve 
fits the data.  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 3 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Given that the diagnostic tests point towards a non-linear relationship, we proceed 
to test our hypotheses by running Tobit models, since the dependent variable Capital 
Invested is constrained. Table 4 shows the results of the Tobit analysis. Model 1 
considers the effect of the control variables, except for the two formal institutional 
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factors, Institutional Differences and Country Stability, which are examined separately in 
Model 2 so that their influence is contrasted with corruption to provide unambiguous 
evidence regarding the factors associated with Capital Invested (Weitzel & Burns, 2006). 
Model 3 investigates a non-linear relationship between Corruption and Capital Invested 
by including a linear term and a quadratic term. Model 4 assesses separately the effect of 
Market Seeking motivations and Model 5 and Model 6 consider the moderating effect of 
Market Seeking. All the models are statistically significant (p<0.01), as indicated by the 
Likelihood Ratio X2, and the addition of variables of interest significantly improves the 
explanatory power of each model (p<0.05), as indicated by the change in the Likelihood 
Ratio X2. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 4 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Models 3-6 in Table 4 show that the linear coefficient of corruption is negative 
and significant (p<0.01), whereas the quadratic coefficient is positive and significant 
(p<0.05) providing evidence of a U-shaped relationship, in support of Hypothesis 1. 
These findings indicate that, as corruption changes from low to moderate levels, the 
Capital Invested falls to its minimum level (at around the corruption level of 5) and, as 
corruption changes from moderate to high levels, investment increases. These findings 
provide evidence at low to moderate levels of corruption for the “grabbing hand” view 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002, Wei, 2000) and, at high levels of corruption, for the “helping 
hand” view (Lui, 1985; Wheeler & Mody, 1992). Moreover, the addition of the 
corruption terms increases the significance of Model 3 (p<0.01), revealing that corruption 
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has a significant effect on capital commitment, in addition to the effects of the formal 
institutional factors. Models 4-6 of Table 4 display coefficient estimates for Market 
Seeking motivations, which show a positive significant effect (p<0.01) on Capital 
Invested, providing support for Hypothesis 2 and are in line with the scholarly arguments 
about the liability of foreignness (Eden & Miller, 2004; Luo, 2004). Models 5 and 6 in  
Table 4 show respectively that the interaction of Market Seeking motivations with the 
linear coefficient of Corruption is positive and significant (p-value<0.01), and the 
interaction of Market Seeking motivations with the quadratic coefficient of Corruption is 
positive and significant (p-value<0.01). These findings provide support for Hypothesis 3, 
that market-seeking motives positively moderate the Corruption-Capital Invested 
relationship at both low to moderate levels of corruption and at high levels of corruption.   
A number of control variables are shown in Model 1 and 2 in Table 4 to 
significantly influence the MNB’s capital Investment. PDI and UAI distance, home and 
host country restrictions and bank size are all found to have a negative effect on MNB 
market commitment. Moreover, country stability has a positive effect.  
 
5.1. Robustness analyses 
Additional analysis was performed to investigate the robustness of the findings by 
employing Share of Equity as an alternative measure of market commitment (Chari & 
Chang, 2009). The diagnostic tests show results which are similar to the previous analysis 
(please see Table 5 and Figure 2).  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 




Insert Figure 2 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Subsequently, we employed Tobit analysis on the same exploratory and control 
variables as shown in Table 6. The results remained qualitatively similar to those 
presented above, supporting all three hypotheses. The sensitivity of the non-linear 
findings was further investigated by using an alternative measure of corruption, the 
Heritage Foundation’s Corruption Freedom score. Results indicate a U-shaped 
relationship, which further supports the robustness of the findings (the results are not 
presented here, but are obtainable from the authors).   
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 6 about here 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
A central theme of this study is that the uncertainty perceived in the host country 
due to corruption interacts with the bank’s growth motives to determine the level of 
market commitment. Our findings suggest that growth motives dominate because market-
seeking banks invest more capital than non market-seeking banks do for similar levels of 
corruption. To investigate the robustness of this finding, we replaced the corruption and 
market-seeking motives in our models with two ex ante variables which measure the 
perceived risk and opportunity in the host country: the percentage of non-performing 
banking loans and the average ROE in the banking sector respectively. Data were 
gathered from the IMF’s Global Financial Stability Report through the World Bank’s 
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Databank. The average for the three years before entry was calculated for these two 
variables. The results reported in Table 7 show that non-performing loans have a negative 
and significant effect on capital investment (p<0.05) and the ROE has a positive and 
significant effect on capital investment (p<0.01). These findings are in line with our risk-
return argument. We also assess the importance of these two variables by estimating the 
change of the dependent variable when a variable of interest changes from low values 
(25th percentile) to high values (75th percentile) while all other variables are taken at their 
average value. This analysis shows that increasing the ROE contributes to a 33% increase 
in Capital Invested, whereas increasing non-performing loans contributes only to a 13% 
decrease in Capital Invested. These results provide support for our findings of the 
dominant effect of market-seeking motives on market commitment. 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Insert Table 7 about here 
-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------           
 
6. Discussion and conclusion 
The findings indicate a U-shaped relationship between corruption and two 
measures of market commitment: the capital invested and share of equity. At low to 
moderate levels of corruption, there is evidence of the “grabbing hand” view and at high 
levels of corruption there is support for the “helping hand” view. We argue that the 
determining factor is the perceived uncertainty (Rodriguez et al., 2005), which is higher 
at moderate levels of corruption where bribery is opportunistic and random (Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1993) and lower at high levels of corruption where the bribing system is more 
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organized and the “rules of the game” are known (Wei, 1997). MNBs which enter a host 
country find it hard to access resources (Mian, 2006), depending on the level of 
corruption in the host country. Moderate levels of corruption may be associated with the 
highest level of difficulty, thus constraining MNB capital commitment. However, at a 
high level of corruption it may be more obvious to the bank how to minimize the risks of 
entry, thereby committing more resources. These findings may raise important issues for 
host countries with moderate levels of corruption, such as Hungary and Malaysia, which 
may need to address corruption more radically than highly corrupt countries, such as 
Indonesia and Vietnam, as the potential loss of MNB capital is high (Clarke et al., 2003).  
The findings also show that market-seeking motives positively moderate the 
relationship at both low to moderate levels of corruption and at high levels of corruption. 
We argue that, at moderate levels of corruption where uncertainty is high, the investment 
may be defensive in nature, aiming to protect the bank from the difficulties of corruption 
and safeguard the MNB’s growth aspirations; whereas, at high levels of corruption where 
uncertainty is lower, investment may be offensive, aiming to develop the capacity to 
increase the loan portfolio and potential rewards.  This finding is in line with country-
level studies showing that market-seeking investment compensates for the costs of 
corruption (Brouthers et al., 2008; Egger & Winner, 2005). However, this firm level 
study identifies the specific challenges for entrants. Banks may face problems with the 
quality of information, with gaining legitimacy, and with protecting contracts which may 
lead to higher loan defaults (Lensink et al., 2008; Mian, 2006). This is a bigger problem 
at moderate levels of corruption and banks may invest in additional staff to enhance their 
ability to assess and monitor loans and in marketing to build external legitimacy.  
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This study makes a number of contributions. First, it sheds light on the debate 
about the effects of corruption on FDI. The findings that both views hold but at different 
levels of corruption may help consolidate the current theoretical arguments and better 
interpret empirical findings. Moreover, the results suggest that depending on the level of 
corruption, multinationals may need to make different choices in managing corruption in 
host countries, thus opening up a new avenue of research on MNEs’ selection of a 
country and their foreign market entry strategies. 
Moreover, the study advances the firm internationalization literature by extending 
the limited research on the influence of corruption on foreign entry strategies. Drawing 
on the resource dependence theory and the institutional theory, we provide an explanation 
of resource commitment to the risks of host country corruption. By theorizing that banks’ 
growth motives dominate the risks of corruption and that banks invest additional 
resources in corrupt countries to mitigate these risks, the study advances our 
understanding of the types of risk and cost that MNBs experience in host countries and 
how the firms respond. This study complements current studies which employ transaction 
cost analysis or institutional theory to evaluate choices of mode of entry and 
acknowledges that government corruption is an important determinant of foreign entry 
decisions.  
Finally, this study contributes to the banking literature by examining corruption, a 
little studied phenomenon with significant implications for MNB growth. Corruption may 
create high potential costs for bank foreign operations, and this study discusses how 
banks manage at different levels of corruption through managing their resource 
allocations. This is an important issue for investors and host countries alike, given that 
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MNBs through their capabilities and resources contribute to the efficiency of local banks 
and the funding of local institutions and businesses (DeHaas & Naaborg, 2006). 
 
6.1. Managerial relevance 
The study finds evidence for both the “grabbing hand” view and the “helping 
hand” view of corruption. Therefore, managers may need to decide how to manage 
corruption in the host country. Highly corrupt countries may pose an advantage for 
MNBs which are prepared to consider bribery demands. However, in countries with 
moderate levels of corruption, bribing is less effective and corruption carries a high price 
for all MNBs. Nevertheless, banks which pursue growth strategies may face bigger 
challenges since corruption significantly increases the liability of foreignness and exposes 
a firm’s investment to systematic risk, i.e. to volatility in performance which managers 
cannot control. In this environment, entry strategy may not be driven solely by managers’ 
growth aspirations, but rather, by a pragmatic interplay of costs and benefits to establish 
the level of market commitment. The study identifies potential corruption costs which 
bank managers may consider when pursuing market-seeking strategies.  
 
6.2. Limitations and future directions 
This study is not without weaknesses. First, due to the study’s cross-sectional 
design, firms’ motivations and decisions are captured before each MNB experiences 
corruption in the host country. A longitudinal study may benefit from examining different 
stages of commitment as the MNB learns how to deal with corruption. The second 
weakness is that corruption is measured using the traditional notion of corruption, the 
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bribery of government officials, which is too narrow to capture fully how corruption 
surfaces in private party dealings. Consequently, the demand to collect corruption data 
not only at government level but also at firm level is well substantiated (Reinikka & 
Svensson, 2005). Finally, the study examines a single industry and this may limit the 
generalization of the findings. As discussed above, banking is a highly regulated industry 
and corruption may significantly increase the risks and potential costs; our results may 
therefore present a worst case scenario.  
Given that this is the first study to examine a non-linear relationship between 
corruption and foreign market commitment more studies may follow this approach to 
assess the salient factors which affect entrants’ perception of the “grabbing hand” and the 
“helping hand”. Is there a learning effect? Do entrants change their market commitment 
strategies as they accumulate experience from entering other corrupt countries? And 
which countries may seem to be better learning grounds? Moreover, in this study we 
suggest that the potential costs of corruption may differ according to firm-specific factors 
such as firms’ strategic motivation, their monitoring of agency relationships and their 
level of legitimacy. Establishing empirically which parent characteristics may influence 
the magnitude of the corruption costs encountered by a local subsidiary may help foreign 
entrants to assess and manage corruption more effectively.  
In conclusion, we find evidence for both the “grabbing hand” view of corruption 
and the “helping hand” view. In addition, we find that corruption does not deter bank 
managers seeking growth from investing additional resources in the host country.  
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Table 1 Host Countries and corruption 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Country       CPI Rating 2002        
Brazil    4.0 
Canada    9.0      
Chile    7.5 
China    3.5 
Columbia   3.6 
Czech Republic   3.7  
Egypt    3.4 
France    6.3      
Ghana    3.9 
Germany   7.3 
Greece    4.2  
Hong Kong   8.2 
Hungary   4.9   
Indonesia   1.9 
Ireland    6.9 
Israel    7.3 
Italy     5.2  
Kenya    1.9 
Luxemburg   9.0 
Malaysia   4.9 
Mexico    3.6 
Netherlands     9.0   
Philippines   2.6     
Poland    4.0  
Russia    2.7  
Singapore     9.3 
Slovakia   3.7 
South Africa   4.8 
South Korea   4.5 
Spain    7.1 
Sweden    9.3 
Switzerland     8.5       
Tunisia    4.8 
Turkey    3.2 
UAE    5.2 
UK       8.7     
US     7.7 
Uruguay   5.1 
Vietnam   2.4 




Table 2 Descriptive statistics and correlations between the variables 
________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
Variables Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9    10  11 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
1. Capital Invested (ratio) 0.036 0.037      
2. Size (# of employees 00s) 180 240 -0.050  
3. Local Experience (Years) 12.24 34.80 0.109 0.126   
4. PDI Distance 1.34 2.71 -0.179* -0.090 -0.087   
5. UAI Distance 1.64 2.25 -0.144 0.036 -0.131  0.000   
6. Institutional Differences 4.02 1.45 -0.177* -0.130  0.132   0.237**  -0.148         
7. Country Stability 4.40 1.38 0.183*        0.023 -0.104 0.221  0.126 -0.329 
8. Host Country Restrictions 0.12 0.32 -0.246** -0.114 -0.114  0.050  0.091 -0.042 0.156     
9. Home Country Restrictions 0.076 0.26 -0.180* -0.298** -0.092 0.082 -0.084 0.177*      0.042         0.202*              
10. Acquisition 0.33 0.47 0.066 0.195*          0.058 -0.059 -0.136 0.035 -.006          -0.030 0.110 
11. Market Seeking 4.65 1.19 0.219** 0.144 0.068  0.172*   0.056 - 0.194*   -0.126    -0.151 -0.296**       0.217*              
12. Corruption (CPI reversed) 3.49 2.12 -0.226** 0.093 -0.138  0.334**  0.057  0.395** -0.258**      0.346**       0.220**     -0.080    0.169 
_______________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ 
*p<0.05 level (two-tailed); **p<0.01 level (two-tailed); n=131 
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Table 3 Chow test for structural change on the Corruption – Capital Invested relationship 
  
Structural Change Test 
Break Point Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F Corruption Capital Invested  
5.0 0.47 2 127 3.38 0.037 
5.1 1.62 2 127 3.52 0.032 




Figure 1 Scatter plot with quadratic equation fit 
 
Capital Invested (%) 
        Corruption (CPI inverted) 
Fit statistic: F(2,128)= 4.3, p=0.01
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Table 4 Results of Tobit regression analysis on Capital Invested  
___________________________________________________________________________________________ 
        
               Model 1     Model 2    Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Log Size  -0.613*     -0.703**     -0.563* -0.575* -0.451 -0.478 
  (0.351)     (0.344) (0.337) (0.330) (0.322) (0.320) 
Local Experience  0.004     0.006     0.006 0.004 0.005 0.004  
  (0.006)     (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
PDI Distance  -0.134     -0.201**          -0.214** -0.238*** -0.284*** -0.289*** 
  (0.086)     (0.087) (0.086) (0.085) (0.083) (0.083) 
UAI Distance -0.146     -0.177*             -0.239**  -0.245** -0.207**   -0.216**       
  (0.105)     (0.102) (0.099) (0.097) (0.095) (0.095) 
Host Country Restrictions -1.577**     -2.222**    -2.074** -1.730** -0.161 -0.114  
   (0.766)     (0.790) (0.787) (0.784) (0.779) (0.778) 
Home Country Restrictions -2.409**     -2.082**    -1.431 -0.891 0.358 0.411 
   (0.998)     (0.986) (0.980) (0.986) (1.033) (1.034) 
Acquisition  0.463     0.492    0.567 0.736 0.735 0.680 
   (0.503)     (0.490) (0.473) (0.469) (0.455) (0.455)  
Institutional Differences     -0.184    -0.286 -0.287 -0.222 -0.219 
       (0.173) (0.180) (0.176) (0.172) (0.172) 
Political stability       0.391**      0.531***            0.527***                0.486*** 0.476***  
       (0.188) (0.197) (0.193) (0.188) (0.188) 
Corruption       -4.179*** -4.230*** -3.364*** -3.277*** 
     (0.169) (0.147) (1.143) (1.146) 
Corruption Squared    3.819*** 3.706*** 2.634** 2.497**  
     (1.157) (1.136) (1.149) (1.158) 
Market Seeking     0.581** 0.641*** 0.661*** 
      (0.240) (0.234)  (0.234) 
CorruptionXMarketSeeking     0.824*** 
  (0.260)  
CorruptionSquaredXMarketSeeking           0.873***
            (0.268)
    
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Log Likelihood (LL)   -306.03 -302.54  -296.31   -293.42  -288.51 -288.24 
Likelihood Ratio X2   21.34*** 28.33***  40.79***  46.56***  56.39*** 56.92*** 
Δ Likelihood Ratio X2   6.99***  12.46***  5.77**  9.83*** 10.36*** 
__________________________________________________________________________________________ 
N=131 
***p<.01; **p<.05; * p<.1 (two-tailed); unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parenthesis are reported 
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Table 5 Chow test for structural change on the Corruption – Share of Equity relationship 
  
Structural Change Test 
Break Point Num DF Den DF F Value Pr > F Corruption Share of Equity  
4.7 80 2 127 3.08 0.049 
4.8 37 2 127 3.44 0.035 
4.9 50 2 127 3.14 0.046 




Figure 2 Scatter plot and quadratic equation fit 
 
 
Share of Equity (%) 
 
       Corruption (CPI inverted) 
Fit statistic: F(2,128)= 14.7, p=0.00 
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Table 6 Results of Tobit regression analysis on Share of Equity  
______________________________________________________________________________________ 
        
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
 
Log Size  -8.716 -9.164 -4.363 -4.533 -3.677 -3.909  
  (6.979) (6.922) (6.662) (6.456) (6.327) (6.303) 
Local Experience  -0.105  -0.087 -0.107  -0.121 -0.119 -0.122 
  (0.123) (0.122) (0.115) (0.112) (0.109) (0.109) 
PDI Distance  -3.066* -3.239*      -2.901* -3.370**         -4.018** -4.068** 
  (1.608) (1.658) (1.593) (1.557) (1.557) (1.567) 
UAI Distance  0.088 0.0278           -1.040  -1.032 -0.086 -0.963     
  (2.091) (2.086) (2.061) (2.002) (1.929) (1.928) 
Host Country Restrictions -50.673*** -55.325*** -47.206*** -41.836***      -36.162*** -36.288*** 
   (13.516) (14.337) (14.016) (13.736) (13.581) (13.574) 
Home Country Restrictions -50.192*** -46.468** -29.121* -19.402 -4.886 -4.421 
   (17.858) (17.856) (17.414) (17.277) (18.032) (18.187) 
Acquisition  -7.713 -8.878  -6.827  -3.498 -3.766 -4.105 
   (9.615) (9.520) (9.124) (8.956) (8.695) (8.702) 
Institutional Differences  -4.405 -7.715** -7.534** -6.676** 6.650** 
   (3.371) (3.525) (3.406) (3.320) (3.317) 
Political stability   -3.953  0.999            1.128             0.709 0.654 
    (3.700) (3.907) (3.859) (3.747) (3.752) 
Corruption    -79.875***      -76.822*** -66.698*** 66.426*** 
     (23.277) (22.511) (22.293) (22.318) 
Corruption Squared    64.290*** 59.289*** 48.177** 47.565** 
     (22.431) (21.759) (21.727) (21.815) 
Market Seeking      10.376** 9.857** 10.352** 
      (4.467) (4.353) (4.348) 
CorruptionXMarketSeeking      10.372** 
  (4.874) 
CorruptionSquaredXMarketSeeking   10.508** 
    (5.081) 
--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Log Likelihood (LL)   -362.83 -361.69  -354.21 -351.53  -349.28 -349.40 
Likelihood Ratio X2  40.34*** 42.61***  57.57***    62.93***  67.43*** 67.20*** 




***p<.01; **p<.05; * p<.1 (two-tailed); unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in 
parenthesis are reported 
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Table 7 Results of Tobit regression analysis of ROE and Loan Defaults on Capital Invested   
____________________________________________________________ 
        
  Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 
Log Size  -0.695** -0.653** -0.626*   
  (0.333) (0.326) (0.317)  
Local Experience  -0.006  -0.006 -0.005   
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
PDI Distance  -0.205** -0.179**      -0.215** 
  (0.085) (0.083) (0.082) 
UAI Distance -0.183* -0.153           -0.110 
  (0.099) (0.098) (0.096) 
Host Country Restrictions -2.035*** -1.574** -1.284*   
   (0.760) (0.766) (0.751)  
Home Country Restrictions -1.994** -1.675* -1.732*  
   (0.952) (0.940) (0.913) 
Acquisition  0.498 0.405  0.498  
   (0.475) (0.466) (0.453) 
Institutional Differences -0.178 -0.222 -0.221  
  (0.167) (0.165) (0.160)  
Political stability  0.399**  0.514***         0.432**              
   (0.181) (0.183) (0.180)   
Non-performing loans  -0.626**        -0.596**  
    (0.254) (0.254) 
ROE     0.632*** 
     (0.224)  
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Log Likelihood (LL)   -304.99 -302.03  -298.17  
Likelihood Ratio X2  28.45*** 34.36***  42.09***     
Δ Likelihood Ratio X2    5.91**  7.73*** 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
Predicted value (ROE at 75%)/Predicted value (ROE at 25%) = 1.329   
Predicted Value (N.P. Loans at 25%)/Predicted value (N.P. Loans at 75%) = 1.132   
________________________________________________________________ 
N=131 
***p<.01; **p<.05; * p<.1 (two-tailed); unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in 





   
 
